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Cooperation between the BRICS states is often framed as being a part of new forms 
of South-South Cooperation (SSC). This is clearly problematic, given the presence of 
Russia, which is neither geographically nor historically part of the Global South, and 
China, which suffers from schizophrenia when it comes to its identity as part of the 
developing world. In spite of this, South-South rhetoric is used by both policymakers 
and scholars when referring to BRICS. This needs to be problematized as it suggests a 
particular kind of cooperation – different from traditional North-South cooperation. 
The idea of SSC tends to evoke a positive image of solidarity between developing 
countries through the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge. This is 
intended to shift the international balance of power and help developing nations 
break away from aid dependence and achieve true emancipation from former colonial 
powers – with the underlying assumption that it is always mutually beneficial (mutual 
benefit being one of the principles of SSC identified by the UN office for SSC). 
Many analyses of the BRICS are thus based on the implicit and somewhat vague 
assumption that trade between states engaged in SSC would be less exploitative than 














































between states of the South would be more responsive to the development needs of 
the South. This supposedly distinguishes it from North-South cooperation where the 
interaction is usually one based on unequal relations of dependence. There needs to 
be greater critical engagement with the question of whether and how South-South, 
intra-BRICS and BRICS-Global South cooperation differs qualitatively from South-
North cooperation in practice, especially as states often use positive assumptions 
about SSC to justify their activities. For example, China and India use it to justify 
what some regard as neo-imperialism in Africa, hiding behind the discourse of 
southern solidarity. Similarly, aspects of South Africa’s cooperation with the rest of 
the continent has been criticised for being hegemonic or sub-imperialist. We cannot 
assume that cooperation amongst the BRICS and between the BRICS and the rest of 
the developing world will not promote relations of dependence, particularly when we 
take into account the tremendous stratification between different states in the global 
South.
When thinking about cooperation between the BRICS, it is important to ask what 
motivations these states may have for cooperating. Primarily, one could argue that 
the main rationale behind the BRICS grouping is a pragmatic one. Undoubtedly, all the 
BRICS states are pursuing their strategic economic, trade and geopolitical interests 
through this alliance.  It is also an attempt by the members to strengthen their 
bargaining positions in international institutions. This fits nicely with the neoliberal 
institutionalist position that contends that cooperation between states only occurs 
when states clearly have something to gain from the interaction – in other words, 
when they are serving their own self-interest. The perception that there appears to 
be more willingness to gather around an economic agenda than around security issues 
further underlines this position. While there are obvious pragmatic motivations for 
cooperation amongst the BRICS, it is clear that there is also a strong ideational and 
even ideological undercurrent. These states also present themselves as campaigners 
for the reform of the current system of global governance. This suggests that, 
beyond pursuing their self-interest, there is something else driving cooperation – 
what some have called a common worldview. This leads us to the question: to what 
extent are elements like commonalities between participants and a shared worldview 
a prerequisite for successful cooperation?
In trying to answer this question, I will draw on some work that I am doing on 
friendship between states. I am not claiming that, in order to cooperate, states need to 
be friends. Nor am I suggesting that the BRICS states are friends. But the framework 
of friendship can provide us with some interesting indications for what the building 
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blocs of successful and sustainable cooperation might be. 
The notion of friendship is one that has intrigued 
philosophers for centuries, but has remained largely 
outside the analytical focus of International Relations. In 
fact, friendship is generally regarded as essentially alien to 
international politics. Many IR scholars would have us believe 
that states all behave indiscriminately similarly towards 
each other in their quest for survival and national security. 
But over the past two decades, constructivist scholars have 
pointed out that states’ perceptions, which are based on 
previous interactions, shared values, and so forth, shape 
state interaction. While the notion of friendship is thus rare 
in IR theory, in practice, and especially in the language of 
statecraft, we see it appearing time and again. The Chinese 
government has, for example, become well versed in using 
the language of friendship to justify its activities in Africa 
(essentially, resource extraction). Statements like: “China 
and Africa…have established deep friendship of more than 
half a century based on equality and mutual benefit” have 
become commonplace.
So what does it mean for states to be friends, and what 
are the implications for cooperation? While there is no 
agreement as to what exactly friendship between states 
entails it is possible to identify certain criteria for or markers 
of friendship, including historical ties commonalities, 
ongoing interaction, institutionalisation and shared vision/
worldview. I will briefly look at the last four.
Unlike the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) 
states, which clearly have many commonalities, making the 
group a natural alliance, one of the major criticisms leveled 
against the BRICS is that the member states are too diverse 
to present any real prospect for unified action. One could, 
however, argue that the BRICS countries share a common 
experience in that they were all negatively affected by being 
on the periphery of a world system dominated by the United 
States and its Western allies. All members are striving to 
modernise their economies while simultaneously addressing 
social problems. In addition, all BRICS states are facing the 
challenge of rapid urbanisation and growing urban poverty. 
From a more critical perspective, civil society critics have 
noted that the BRICS also share socio-economic violations, 
including severe inequality, poverty, unemployment, 
inadequate education and health care, costly basic services 
and housing, constraints on labour organizing, and extreme 
levels of violence especially against women, political and 
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civil rights violations, such as widespread 
police brutality, increase securitization, media 
repression.
Ongoing interaction is another aspect often cited 
as a prerequisite for friendship and cooperation. 
Statistics show us that there has been increased 
interaction in the area of commercial relations 
between the BRICS states. Increased commercial 
ties also stimulate the expansion of linkages 
in other social arenas beyond the market - 
we see this in areas like tourism. Ultimately, 
high levels of interaction (including trade) 
is believed to increase trust between states, 
and helps to promote and cement friendship. 
Relatedly, some scholars explore international 
friendship as a pattern of institutionalised 
interactions – in other words, argues that 
friendship can be consolidated though the 
process of institutionalisation. While formal 
institution-building is a part of this (with the 
New Development Bank being the only example 
of formal BRICS institutionalisation thus far) 
informal forms of institutionalisation such 
as meetings, interactions, official ceremonies, 
and agreements are equally significant. The 
BRICS summits, meetings between ministers of 
finance and health, and so forth, are important 
in this regard. But so too is interaction between 
non-state actors, members of civil society, at 
events like this one. 
All the summits thus far have called for greater 
cooperation among the members beyond the 
level of governments. Thus far, we have seen 
the establishment of the BRICS Academic 
Forum (now formalised through the formation 
of the BRICS Think Tanks Council) and the 
BRICS Business Council. We therefore need to 
view cooperation in a broad sense – not just in 
terms of economic or political cooperation, but 
also cooperation in the sense of sharing ideas 
and best practice. The IBSA model of sectoral 
cooperation across issue areas like education, 
tourism, climate change, agriculture could 
prove instructive in this regard.
Groupings or clubs like the BRICS do not have 
democratic legitimacy, and lack accountability. It is therefore 
essential that civil society monitor the impact the group’s 
policies are having on the populations not just of these five 
states, but also on other developing states. In July this year a 
group of South African civil society organisations submitted 
a concept note on the establishment of a BRICS Civil Society 
forum to the SA Sherpa. The idea is to develop a formal space 
for civil society to participate in the BRICS summits and 
influence its agenda, and to coordinate with the BRICS Think 
Tank and BRICS Business Councils. To date, civil society 
activity has been on the fringes: for example the BRICS from 
below initiative during the Durban summit in 2013. Civil 
society can contribute to democratising the discourse on 
BRICS, and also by playing a monitoring role. In order to play 
this role, civil society will have to be more innovative and 
address some challenges – such as the fractured collaboration 
between different kinds of African civil society groups. Civil 
society also needs to broaden engagement with academia. 
Overall, an increase in regular meetings between state and 
non-state actors will facilitate the exchange of ideas, allow 
for the debate of common challenges and help to identify 
issues on which the BRICS can speak with one voice. 
Finally, one aspect of friendship between states is deemed 
particularly important by scholars of friendship in IR, 
namely a common vision or shared project. The BRICS 
members also claim to share a particular worldview, or at 
least share a sense of dissatisfaction with the current system 
of global governance. They have in common an interest in 
the reorientation of power towards multipolarity and a 
commitment to state sovereignty. In addition, the BRICS 
have articulated their common desire to reform what they 
regard as the unjust nature of the current global order, and 
have committed themselves to reforming global institutions 
like the IMF and the World Bank. 
Despite all of the above, important differences remain. While 
they share a common concern about the need to reform the 
global governance system, they do not always agree on how 
this should be done. The debate about UN Security Council 
reform is a case in point. Similarly, when, in 2010, they had 
the opportunity to support a candidate from the global South 
for managing director of the IMF, they were unable to reach 
consensus. This raises questions around their ability to bring 
about reform of global institutions. It must not be forgotten 
that, while the potential of cooperation between the BRICS 
in the fields of commerce and trade remains great, they are 












































Multiple, and often contradictory, foreign policy 
commitments have already proven very difficult for the 
South government to navigate. This points to another 
potential stumbling bloc for greater BRICS cooperation 
relates to the commitments individual BRICS members have 
to other alliances. All five BRICS states have existing and 
significant bilateral relations with states like the USA, which 
raises questions about the extent to which they are able to 
provide a counter pole to US power. In the case of South 
Africa despite the BRICS having a foreign policy priority, its 
position in Africa and regional organisations like the African 
Union will always take precedence over its alliance with 
the BRIC states. This is evident not only in South Africa’s 
stated foreign policy (for example in the Department of 
International Relations’ strategic plans) but also in its 
actions. In any cooperation agreement  - for example 
relating to bilateral trade agreements, South Africa will have 
to take into account its existing commitments to the South 
African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African 
Development Community. Politically, South Africa generally 
abides by the African. For example on UNSC reform, South 
Africa has not joined the G4 (Brazil, India, Germany and 
Japan) pushing for UNSC reform as its loyalties lie first and 
foremost with the African Union position.
One could also ask to what extent South Africa’s domestic 
imperatives and foreign policy vision dovetails with that 
of the other BRICs, in other words, to what extent greater 
cooperation with these states is in the country’s national 
interest. There has been a mixed reaction in South Africa 
to the government’s BRICS strategy - both within the 
ruling alliance and from civil society. Some applaud it as 
an alternative to western investment. On the other hand, 
there are those – including the trade unions - who argue 
that increased BRICS imports are hurting South Africa’s 
manufacturing sector (which is key to job creation). Other 
critics (both from within the ruling party and from civil 
society) warn that aligning too closely with China and Russia 
can be damaging to South Africa’s role as a state that is 
regarded as a moral power that promotes democracy and 
human rights. 
With regard to greater civil society engagement, obstacles 
also abound. One needs to take cognisance of the fact that 
civil society groups have limited resources and do not 
necessarily see engaging with the BRICS as a priority, in light 
of domestic challenges like poverty an inequality requiring 
urgent attention.  This is linked to the fact that, historically, 
there has been a lack of engagement between civil society 
and foreign policy issues. Clearly, a big 
stumbling bloc in cooperation between BRICS 
civil societies is the huge discrepancy between 
the positions and status of civil society in the 
individual BRICS states. While civil society is 
reasonably strong and visible in India, Brazil and 
South Africa, the situation looks very different 
in Russia and China. This impacts on the level of 
engagement with and influence civil society can 
exert over national policymakers. 
In conclusion, the grouping is still young and 
will have to prove itself in terms of its ability 
to engender real, meaningful and mutually 
beneficial cooperation between member 
states. Continuous engagement with the 
intergovernmental grouping by academics and 
other members of civil society will be crucial 
to ensuring that the BRICS grouping makes the 
kind of contribution to global governance that 
will address the existing global inequalities and 
improve the lives of the majority of the world’s 
people.
